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Abstract 
Abstract of the thesis titled: 
Indeterminacy in Small Open Economy Models with Endogenous Time Preference 
Submitted by BIAN YONG 
for the degree of Master of Philosophy in Economics 
at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in June, 2003. 
Recent research shows that indeterminacy can arise in multisector models with 
production functions that exhibit socially constant but privately decreasing returns. 
This thesis extends previous research by exploring two sector open economy models 
with externalities in production. 
This thesis consists of two parts. In the first part, by extending Nishimura and 
Shimomura (2002)'s model, it shows that indeterminacy arises if the ranking of 
private and social factor intensities among sectors satisfies certain conditions and if 
the rate of time preference is an increasing function of the average level of 
consumption. 
In the second part, we extend Weder (2001) to include endogenous labor supply. 
We show that Weder (2001)'s indeterminacy result is robust to this extension, that is 
indeterminacy is obtained not only at lower returns to scale than in the closed 
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1 Introduction 
Recent research in macroeconomics highlights the importance of self-fulfilling 
prophecies in explaining economic instability. Models identified with this 
indeterminacy literature, in the sense that there exist a continuum of equi-
librium trajectories converging to a steady state, underscore that equilibria 
need not be uniquely determined by the fundamentals of the economy, and 
the existence of indeterminate equilibria is associated with the possibility of 
self-fulfilling properties. 
In most of the previous theoretical literature, indeterminacy is obtained 
under the assumption that production displays socially increasing returns to 
scale. Recent empirical studies, however, indicate that returns to scale are 
roughly constant, if not decreasing. Therefore, a crucial problem is whether 
indeterminacy is theoretically possible under socially constant or even de-
creasing returns Among recent research, Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) 
and Benhabib et al. (2000) show that indeterminacy can arise in multisector 
models with concave utility function and Cobb-Douglas production functions 
that exhibit socially constant but privately decreasing returns. Meng and 
Velasco (1998) proves that the conclusion is also true for an open economy 
model by introducing an international credit market. 
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This thesis extends the previous research by exploring two sector open 
economy models with externalities in production. In particular, the thesis 
consists of two parts. In the first part, we extend Nishimura and Shimomura 
(2002)'s model by assuming the endogenous time preference to be a function 
of the average level of consumption in the economy instead of the one of 
representative's private consumption used in their paper. We show that the 
result they get is still tenable to this extension, which means indeterminacy 
arises if the ranking of private and social factor intensities among sectors 
satisfies certain conditions and if the rate of time preference is an increasing 
function of the average level of consumption. In the second part, we study 
an international economy version of Benhabib and Farmer (1996). It shows 
that indeterminacy can be obtained at lower returns to scale than in the 
closed economy case. This finding shows that Weder (2001)，s conclusion 
is robust when endogenous labor supply and endogenous average level time 
preference are introduced. 
One of the reasons we use endogenous time preference here is that a prob-
lem immediately arises by simply applying the closed-economy framework to 
the open economy. If we followed closed-economy models by assuming an 
exogenous discount factor, there would exist a zero-eigenvalue in the dynamic 
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equation system. This would make it impossible to identify conditions for 
indeterminacy, because indeterminacy generally occurs when the Jacobian 
matrix is non-singular and the number of negative eigenvalues exceed the 
number of predetermined variables.i 
This thesis incorporates an endogenous discount factor that is widely used 
in the literature with regard to real business cycle models in a small open 
economy. The endogeny of the discount factor eliminates the singularity 
problem and enables us to assess conditions for indeterminacy on technologies 
and preferences. 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes 
a general case of indeterminacy in a small open economy with endogenous 
time preference and shows that indeterminacy arises if the ranking of private 
and social factor intensities among sectors satisfies certain conditions and if 
the rate of time preference is an increasing function of the level of average 
level of consumption. Section 3 develops a two-sector open economy version 
of Benhabib and Farmer (1996) with endogenous labor supply and shows 
that indeterminacy is obtained at lower returns to scale than in the closed 
^See, e.g., Farmer (1999). This is however, a sufficient condition but not a necessary 
one. In some cases, indeterminacy can arise even if the Jacobian matrix is singular. See 
Weder (2001) for an example. 
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economy case. 
2 Indeterminacy in a Small Open Economy 
Model with Endogenous Time Preference 
In this part, we analyze a general case of indeterminacy in a small open econ-
omy with endogenous time preference. This is an extension to Nishimura and 
Shimomura (2002), which show that, even under socially constant returns to 
scale, indeterminacy can arise in a dynamic small open economy with pro-
duction externalities and endogenous time preferences in which production 
is incompletely specialized. We prove that if the instantaneous rate of time 
preference is a function of average consumption level, the result is still true. 
Moreover, apart from providing an alternative specification for the rate of 
time preference, we demonstrate below that this will considerably simplify 
the algebra by reducing the dynamic systemic differential equations.^ 
Section 2.1 describes the economic environment. It states our main as-
sumptions and introduces a useful analytical tool for our purpose: the GDP 
2See also Shi (1999) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2001), who assume that the rate 
of time preference is an increasing function of per capita consumptions. They all realize 
that analysis can be simplified under the assumption that individual does not internalize 
the consumptions in the discount factor. 
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function. Section 2.2 formulates the dynamic general equilibrium model. 
Section 2.3 shows the main indeterminacy result under the Uzawa assump-
tion, and then the saddle point stability under the Fisher assumption. Sec-
tion 2.4 concludes. 
2.1 Economic Environment 
2.1.1 Technology 
We consider a small open dynamic economy which produces two goods, a pure 
consumption good (good 1) and a pure investment good (good 2), with inputs 
of labor and capital for each good. Here, we assume that labor is a primary 
factor of production and its endowment is constant over time, while capital 
is accumulated through investment. Similar to Nishimura and Shimomura 
(2002), we follow the traditional Oniki and Uzawa's (1965) assumption in 
dynamic trade models that capital is internationally immobile while newly 
produced consumption and investment goods are tradable. The investment 
good serves as the numeraire. The international price of the consumption 
good, p, is given and is time-invariant. 
We choose the same production function used in Benhabib et al. (2000) 
which assumes that the production of each good is subject to the following 
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type of externality 
Yi = F\Ki,Li,KiLi) z - 1 , 2 
where Ki and Li are capital and labor allocated to the zth firm and those 
with upper bar are external effects. In trade theory, this type of external 
effects are called Marshallian factor-generated externalities, in the sense that 
the output of each firm in each sector is affected by the sectorial factor 
allocations that each firm takes as given, that all markets are competitive 
and that firms in each sector have the same technology. is assumed to 
be twice-continuously difFerentiable and linearly homogeneous with respect 
to Ki, Li, Ki and Li. The production function is also assumed to be strictly 
increasing and concave with respect to Ki and Li. That is, production of 
each good is subject to constant returns to scale from the social perspective, 
but decreasing returns to scale from the private perspective. In addition, 
the production function introduces the entry cost to the industry to prevent 
free entry. 
On the other hand, as in Nishimura and Shimomum (2002), we allow 
negative externalities and assume that the production functions exhibit con-
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stant returns to scale from both social and private perspectives. Thus the 
functions are compatible with free entry and exit, and the sectorial produc-
tion functions may be obtained by straightforward aggregation of individual 
firms' (identical) production functions. 
Suppose that good i, z=l,2, is produced by capital, labor and a sector-
specific factor of production (Tj), so that, Yi = F^{K,L,KiLi,Ti). We as-
sume that F^(-) is linearly homogeneous in the six variables. We show that 
the first two linear homogeneity assumptions imply that at least one of Ki, 
Li,and Ti generates a negative externality. 
Now let us formulate the dynamic model. First, define the GDP function 
for given externality terms as 
r(p, K, L, TITIK,L,T,K2L2T2)= 
max \Yi + pY2 s.t.Ks > i^i + K2, 
Ls > Li^L2T^>T,T^>T2] (1) 
where Kg and Lg are the endowments of capital and labor. Note that Ki, 
Li,and Ti are regarded as given in the optimization problem (1). There-
fore, the optimal solution is not generally an efficient resource allocation. 
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It describes a competitive resource allocation distorted by the presence of 
externalities. 
By solving the maximization problem, we can rewrite the GDP function 
as 
� = + fellow ^ ( ) 
where 
T — Li ni< - Ki^l r _ LjFl /ox 
and 
= Fh=pFl � 
l-iL = F l = p F l (5) 
= (6) 
2.1.2 Dynamic Model 
The preferences of the representative agent are described by the utility inte-
gral function as 
oo t 
Uo = J U{Ct)—�-j p{Cr)dT]dt 
0 0 
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where Ct stands for the consumption of traded consumer goods. Here we 
use the average-level instantaneous subjective discount factor, which is an 
increasing (decreasing) function of the economy's average person's consump-
tion. This property indicates that a higher level of the average person's con-
sumption at time "s" increases (decreases) the discount factor to the agent's 
utility at and after "s". Note that if we define the average-level instan-
taneous subjective discount factor as an increasing function of the average 
level of consumption which means that the average person's consumption 
gives disutility to the agent, it captures the "keeping up with the Joneses" 
effect of consumption externalities, recently emphasized among other areas 
in the literature on asset pricing. 
The intertemporal budget constraint is given as 
k t = T - 5 K t - p C t (7) 
To solve the dynamic optimization problem, we formulate the present-value 
Hamiltionian as follows, 
t 
H = U{Ct) exp[- J piCr)dT] + - 6Kt - pCt] 
0 
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The corresponding first-order conditions are given by 
t 
[/'(COexp 卜 j p{Cr)dT]=pcP, (8) 
0 
^ = (9) 
dKt 將 �) 
Therefore in the equilibrium, 
t 




The new costate variable is defined as 
, t 
Xt = (l^,exp[J p{Cr)dr] (12) 
0 
Then, equations (10) and (11) can be rewritten as 
U'iCt) = pXt (13) 
pp 
Xt = XMCt) + S-—] (14) 
1 0 
Thus, we obtain 
� t = _ - § ； 職 ) ( 1 5 ) 
Therefore, we have a 2x2 dynamic system in (C^, Kt) as follows 
Ct =["仰 + ^ - ~ ( ) 
k t = r - 5 K t - p C t (17) 
By log-linearizing around the steady state, the dynamics of the system is 
approximated by 
“In a ) ( All Ai2 ) ( In a - I n C * 、 
= (18) 
�Inkt y y A21 A22 y y In Kt-In IC ) 
where 
AI2 = 0 
A21 = -p 
1 1 
Here we obtain a two by two matrix instead of a three by three one as 
in Nashimura and Shimomura (2001). In this sense, by using average level 
endogenous time discount factor, algebra is significantly simplified. 
Thus, trace and determinant of the Jacobin matrix are given by 
Trace = An + A22 
= i m p � c � ” K ( . ^ 对 
Det =成2 = 碼 p m^^K ( . 巧 -
2.2 The indeterminacy result 
- Mo — XiO^), If we set TAK) - 6 < 0,which means 6 > fij^--~— [x2-xi)e^ 62 
1. Under the Uzawa assumption(p'(Ct) > 0 )，we have DetCA) > 0,Trace(A) < 
0, so indeterminacy arises. 
2. Under the Fisher assumption(p'(Cf) < 0 ), we have Det(A) < 0，so 
there is equilibium uniqueness. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
In this part, we extend Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) by analyzing a gen-
eral case of indeterminacy in a small open economy with endogenous time 
preference. Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) shows that, even under so-
cially constant returns to scale, indeterminacy can arise in a dynamic small 
open economy with production externalities and endogenous time preferences 
in which production is incompletely specialized. By applying the average 
level time preference instead of the individual one into the model, we prove 
that the indeterminacy conditions are the same. Apart from providing an 
alternative specification for the rate of time preference, this method consid-
erably simplifies the algebra by reducing the dimension systemic differential 
equations. 
3 Indeterminacy in a Small Open Economy 
Model with Endogenous Labor Supply 
In this part, we develop another form of two-sector small open economy 
model with externalities in production. In particular, we study an interna-
tional economy version of Benhabib and Farmer (1996), by setting up the 
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similar framework as Weder (2001).. We show that Weder (2001)'s con-
clusion is robust to incorporating endogenous labor supply, which means 
indeterminacy is obtainable at lower returns to scale than in the closed econ-
omy case. This feature of the model is of importance since recent empirical 
work has demonstrated that aggregate scale economies are close to constant.^ 
Moreover, these estimates have pointed to values that are too low to give a 
number of existing indeterminacy models a sufficient empirical foundation. 
The reason for indeterminacy in this model is that perfect capital markets 
allow the smoothing of consumption via international lending and borrowing 
at a constant world interest rate. Accordingly, the implied irrelevance of 
utility curvature makes it easier to construct alternative investment paths, 
the need to curtail consumption as a consequence of investment bunching 
disappears. Indeterminacy still arises from a correct path of prices in the 
presence of externalities, however, these can be minimal in size. Unlike the 
closed economy variant, the desire to smooth consumption must not be offset 
by a sufficient amount of increasing returns. 
In related work, Lahiri (1998) finds that for endogenous growth model, in-
determinacy arises more straightforwardly in a small open economy than in a 
3See’ for example, Basu and Fernald (1997), Burnside (1996), and Harrison (1998) 
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closed economy. Our presented model is less abstractly formulated than that 
of Lahiri (1998) and consequently allows for a more elaborate specification 
of imperfections, e.g., increasing returns. That is, we can quantify returns to 
scale in a way so that plausible inferences can be drawn from empirical work. 
Furthermore, our model structure is well embedded in the formulation which 
is widely used most recently in the indeterminacy literature. In this sense, 
a comparison to closed economy versions can easily be undertaken. Meng 
and Velasco (1998) specify a two-sector open economy model along the lines 
of Benhabib and Nishimura (1998). They allow for decreasing internal and 
constant overall returns to scale in production. In their case, increasing re-
turns may come from fixed costs rather than from a declining marginal costs 
schedule. However we specify only differing externality so as to isolate the 
importance of these effects while assuming constant returns at the firm level. 
In the latest research, Weder (2001) presents a small open economy version 
of the two-sector optimal growth model with production externalities used in 
Benhabib and Farmer (1996), and shows that indeterminacy is considerably 
easier to be obtained under a regime of perfect world capital markets than 
in the closed economy variant. The main differences between this thesis and 
Weder (2001) lie in two aspects. First, unlike Weder (2001) which sets the 
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labor supply to be fixed, we add the endogenous labor supply, hence it could 
polish the model to be more realistic. Second, we investigate an average 
level endogenous time discount factor that is widely used in the literature 
of real business cycle models in a small open economy. By adding this fea-
ture we are able to access conditions for indeterminacy on technologies and 
preferences because it eliminates the singularity problem. Compared with 
Weder (2001)，we find that when the endogenous labor supply is added, al-
though the labor supply elasticities surely affect the equilibrium determinacy 
conditions, Weder (2001)'s result is still tenable, that is indeterminacy is ob-
tainable at lower returns to scale than in the closed economy case. In the 
extensive research on two specific cases, we also prove that the sector specific 
externalities are still need to be present in both sectors in order to obtain 
indeterminacy. 
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. Section 3.1 and 
3.2 present the economic environment and the preference assumption of the 
model representatively. Section 3.3 discusses the equilibrium dynamics and 
indeterminacy. Section 3.4 discusses the scale economic conditions for inde-
terminacy and further investigates two special cases to study the influence of 
sector specific externalities on the indeterminacy conditions. An economic 
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interpretation of the main result is also offered in this section. Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.1 Economic Environment 
The economy is based on Benhabib and Farmer (1996). The main reason 
we choose a two sector model is that it is a fairly general specification of 
an economy with imperfections. However, it still enables these departures 
from constant returns to scale and perfect markets to be quantified in a way 
in which theoretical results can be confronted with empirical work. On the 
other hand, in this small open economy model, agents are allowed to borrow 
and lend internationally. 
We assume that the economy is too small to affect the world interest rate 
so that the interest rate which the representative agent faces is parametric. 
The representative agents own the stock of capital and receive income from 
wages and the rental of capital services to the firm sector. Firms produce 
either consumption goods or investment goods. Each firm has access to an 
externally increasing (or decreasing) returns to scale technology. All markets 
are peil'ectly competitive and factors of production are completely mobile 
between the economy's sectors. Consumer goods are tradeable whereas 
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capital goods are assumed to be nontradeable. 
The production technology of a typical firm in the investment good sector 
is 
yi = [ ( i ^ / H L t O i - f [ i ^ 广 V - T � � " ( � ) i � e (0,1) (19) 
while that of the typical producer of the consumption good is given by 
y? = [^ •(""-〒。(•"(？)“ (20) 
where 
K l + K ? = Kt (21) 
Ll + = (22) 
Here K l and Lf denote the capital and labor services used by the individual 
firm in the investment good producing sector. K} is the average stock of 
capital in this sector and Kt stands for the stock of capital in the country. Oj is 
sector-specific externalities and 07 is the degree of economy-wide externalities 
for the I-branch of the firms. The remaining variables are defined respectively 
with the index C denoting the consumption good producing sector. We 
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assume that tradeable consumption is the numeraire good. Let Wt and rt 
denote the competitive wage and capital, if we set K} = iJ^fKt, Lj. = /i�Lt, 
we get the wage and capital rent rate at the symmetric equilibrium as follows 
Wt = pt{l - a)(/(广V—广(1+�1)(^40(1-")(1+�')么�1("5)-1 or 
(23) 
(24) 
r, " ) i + � , + 力 广 ( 1 + … o r (25) 
(26) 
where pt denotes the relative price of investment goods. 
Prom equations (23) (24) (25) and (26), we obtain 
Mf = 二 A" (27) 
Thus, we could define the relative factor intensities as 
" 广 S 二替 （28) 
19 
Equations (23) (24) (25) and (26) can be simplified as 
wt = (1 一 乂乂/(广 V — ( 2 9 ) 
= ( 1 - a ) ( l -广”严 ( K ^ L t i - � ) i + �丄� 1 
= a ( l - (30) 
We have the relative price as 
Pt = 「。乂 1 - A 严 0 / — a / (31) 
Furthermore, the output in the two sectors are simplified as 
y / = (/(广 L 广 " ( 3 2 ) 
y f = (1 — � ( 瓜 叱 (33) 
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3.2 Preference 
The preferences of the representative agent are described by the utility inte-
gral function as 
OO , , t 
Uo = I (In a — ^ ) e x p [ - J piCr)dr]dt, "'(•) > 0 
0 0 
where Ct stands for the consumption of traded consumer goods, Lt is labor 
supply. Here we use the modified Uzawa type instantaneous subjective 
discount factor, which is an increasing function of the economy's average 
person's consumption.4 This property indicates that a higher level of the 
average person's consumption at time "s" increases the discount factor to the 
agent's utility at and after "s". 
The economy is open to full international capital mobility, so that the 
agent has access to net foreign bonds A , dominated in units of tradeable 
consumer goods and pay the world interest rate q, which is exogenously given 
to the small open economy. Hence we can define the agent's intertemporal 
budget constraint as 
''See, for example, Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) 
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Dt = gDt + Ct+ pJt — WtLt - nKt (34) 
The capital accumulation technology is given by 
kt = I t - SKt (35) 
where is the rate of capital depreciation and is assumed to be positive. 
Therefore, we can analyze the agent's optimization problem by formulat-
ing the present-value Hamiltionian 
t 
H = U{Ct,Lt)exp[- J p{dT�dT]+(l)t�eDt+Ct+PtIt-WtLt-rtKt)+xPt�It—6Kt) 
0 
where (f)^  and 寸尤 are the shadow prices associated with the two constraints 
(34) and (35) subject to initial conditions Dq = D{0) and Kq = K{0)>Q. 
The agent takes as given the average level of consumption, Ct, but in equilib-
rium Ct = Ct- This is also true for externalities in the production functions. 
We obtain the first order conditions as follows, 
t 




-Lf exp卜 j p{Cr)dT] — (l)tWt = 0 (37) 
0 
(kpt = —ih (38) 
-k =小 Q (39) 
-ih = -n(lh -帥 t (40) 
We define a new costate variable as 
t 
Ai = (/),exp[- j p{Cr)dT] (41) 
0 
Therefore, the FOCs in the equilibrium can be rewritten as 
= ^ (42) 
Lf = -XtWt (43) 
V 二 - Q (44) 
-A = n^ -帥 t (45) Pt 
along with the transversality conditions. 
2 3 
3.3 Dynamics of Equilibrium 
From equations (42) and (44), we have 
奢 = 0 - p{Ct) (46) 
Similarly, equations (38) and (40) yield 
A = 一 (47) 
Finally, from equations (38) (39) and (47), we obtain 
= + (48) 
Pt Pt 
or by substituting equations (30) and (31) into it, 
= (p + - (49) 
Pt 
Prom equations (32) and (35) 
^ = /j"严(K广Lfi—")1+�计“了- (5 (50) 
Kt 
2 4 
The unique stationary state implies that 
a6 
Therefore, the dynamic system consists of four differential equations, 
i.e.equations (34) (46) (49) and (50) for {Ct,Pt,Kt, Dt). This is a contrast 
to closed economy models that are generally associated with two differential 
equations. There is then a unique steady state to the system. 
To make the description simple, we define that 
= (1 — + + 
= a{6c + ac - - c^i) 
凡 = { l - a ) { O c + ac-0i-(Ti) 
二 a,洲C 丨pj 
1 Q + 8 — a5 
= ^il + Mi 
By log-linearizing around the steady state, the dynamics of the system is 
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approximated by 
/ . \ / \ ( \ 
In Ct -p'{C'')C* 0 0 0 I n C t - l n C * 
\npt - (Q + S)J2i -(Q-^S)J22 -{Q + S)J23 0 In^it —Inp* 
l i ik t S{J2i-\-Ai) 5(J22 + A2) 6{J23 + A3) 0 I n i ^ ^ - l n i ^ * 
In A i J41 ^42 J44 ^ J \ I n D t — l n D * 乂 
(51) 
where 
, 1 I (1 + X)7 
, (l + x)(^/-7) 1 
->22 = ；5 丄 Pe 
— Pe 
, — P 4 jOi - 7) 1 
& ~ 7 Pel 
Here it is easy to see that -p'{C*)C* is a negative eigenvalue and g 
is a positive eigenvalue, the other two eigenvalues are determined by the 
2 6 
submatrix 
{6 - g)J22 {S - 9)^23 
J = 
^ 5{J22 + A2) 6{J23 + As)) 
Given the structure of (51), we define perfect foresight equilibria and 
indeterminacy as follows, 
Definition 1 (Perfect Foresight Equilibrium). In the model economy, a 
perfect foresight equilibrium is a path of capital and the relative price, initial 
stocks of capital > 0 and debt D(0) satisfying optimal conditions. 
In addition, markets clear and the resource constraints and transversatity 
conditions hold. 
Definition 2 (Indeterminacy). The equilibrium is indeterminate if there 
exist an infinite number of perfect foresight equilibrium paths. 
Note that in the model, physical capital Kt and bonds A are predeter-
mined variables and evolve continuously, while Ct and pt are jump variables-
that means their initial values are not given by history and instead respond 
to new information. The steady state is indeterminate if both eigenvalues 
of J are negative. Since the trace of the matrix is the sum of its eigenvalues 
and the determinant is the product of the eigenvalues, indeterminacy can be 
restated as 
2 7 
TrJ < 0 < DetJ 
In this case, the first order conditions and the transversality conditions are 
not sufficient to determine a unique solution path. Essentially, multiplicity 
of this sort indicates that the rational expectations equilibria involve random 
variables that are unrelated to the economy's fundamentals simply because 
agents believe it to be so. 
3.4 Indeterminacy and Scale Economies 
In this section we will analyze the size of returns to scale that is needed 
to generate indeterminacy. And also we want to show that the labor sup-
ply elasticity factor will also influence the equilibrium determinacy to some 
degree. 
If all four externalities are zero, the economy collapses to the one sector 
model, the equilibrium is unique and the dynamics are degenerate. Through-
out the paper we will assume that the following holds. 
Assumption. The level of increasing returns from all sources is modest. 
2 8 
That is, 
a ( l + 0, + a , ) < l / o r j = (52) 
The assumption of modesty includes values of the externality that are 
empirically plausible given evidence in Basu and Fernald (1997) and Har-
rison (1999). Note that increasing returns are not high enough to induce 
endogenous growth. 
Due to the huge calculation, simple expressions for the steady-state J a c o 
bian matrix are difficult to derive. Instead, we choose particular parameter 
values and solve the model numerically. We calibrate the model for several 
different specifications of the labor supply parameter x=0, 0.5, 2.0 and in-
vestment sector-specific externalities 6>/二0.1. Other parameter values are 
summarized in Table I. 
Table I 
Q； 6 g Gj a^ 
0.4 0.1 0.1 0 0 
These parameter values imply a capital share of 40%, an annual capital 
depreciation rate of 10%, an annual utility discount rate of 10% (since the 
2 9 
time discount factor p equals q at steady state.), and the social specific 
externalities of zero. 
Table II 
Consumption goods sector-specific externality 6c 
Labor supply parameter x -0.35 -0.45 -0.55 -0.65 -0.80 -2.0 
0 S S S S I D 
0.5 S I I D D D 
2.0 S I D D D D 
Examining Table II, we see that indeterminacy can be obtained under 
socially constant or even decreasing returns to scales. Second, varying the 
intertemporal labor supply elasticity has an effect on the determinacy prop-
erties of the model . -
3.4.1 Case 1 
Let us consider two special cases. First, we limit sector specific externalities 
to the investment sector:没c = = � / 二 0, 
Then, 
3 0 
Trace{J) = ^ > 0 
and 
Det{J)=《：二 [(1 - a - a e i ) x _ aOi] 
when y > ^^~—，we have Det{J) > 0’ hence we will get two posi-
1 — a — aOi 
tive eigenvalues in this submatrix or, in other words, will get three positive 
eigenvalues and one negative eigenvalue in the whole system, which means 
the steady state is a source. Otherwise, it will be a saddle point and would 
be unique. If Oj < 0, since Det(J) will always be negative, then we will get 
the unique saddle path equilibrium. 
3.4.2 Case 2 
If O j = G ^ = ( j j = 0, hence 
1 一 a V 一 On 
3 1 
hence Det{J) > 0 when X�没c�Otherwise the steady state would be a 
saddle point. 
Trace(J) = ~~^―^{[(a - 1)7(5 + OiS9c]x 
+ x)i 
+ q)]} 
since p > 0, that means ~ ~ ^ ^ < 1 then (a - 1)7(5 + a56c > 0，also we 
0 + g — ad 
find that since ^ > 0, x > ; ' ’ we will get source. 
(a - 1)7(5 + ad0c 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this part, we study an international economy version of Benhabib and 
Farmer (1996). We show here that Mark Weder (2001)'s conclusion is robust 
to incorporating endogenous labor supply, that is indeterminacy is obtained 
not only at lower returns to scale than in the closed economy case but also 
at insignificant levels thereof. Furthermore, compared with Mark Weder 
(2001)，we find that when the endogenous labor supply and endogenous av-
erage level time discount factor is added, we still need the sector specific 
externalities be present in both sectors to get indeterminacy. However, the 
labor supply elasticity factor will also influence the equilibrium determinacy 
3 2 
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yi = f [ K 广 V — T i ( � « e (0，1) (53) 
2/f = (《广(f )i—" (54) 
where 
K[ + K? = Kt (55) 
L l + L ? = Lt (56) 
Defining 
we obtain the wage and capital rent rate in the symmetric equilibrium as 




r, 二 p , a ( K r V l i + 0 * i ( M f r ( i + � , ) ( " f ) ( i — " ) ( i + W i ^ � V f ) - i (59) 
or 
n = - / i [ r ( i+�c ) ( i - 幼 i + � c ) i ^ � i ( i -
(60) 
where pt denotes the relative price of investment goods. 
Prom equations (57) (58) (59) and (60), we obtain 
M f = " 卜 ( 6 1 ) 
39 
Therefore equations (57) (58) (59) and (60) can be simplified as 
w t = ( 1 —•乂'（i^广 
= ( 1 - a){l - Mt严(K广 (62) 
= a ( l — iit)9c[KtaLti—ay+0c+ocK�i (63) 
Hence, we rewrite the relative price as 
Pt = -〜严(i^广 严 ( 6 4 ) 
Further, output in the two sectors are simplified as 
I f = (65) 




Uo = J j piCr)dr]dt 
0 0 
subject to the agent's intertemporal budget constraint 
Dt = gDt + Ct+ pJt - WtLt - nKt (67) 
the capital accumulation technology is 
kt = It- SKt (68) 
where 
r l + X 
U{CuLt) = \ n C t - j ^ (69) 
Solving the agent's optimization problem by formulating the Hamiltionian 
t 
H = U(Ct,Lt)exp[- J f)(6r)dT�+(j)人QDt+Ct+PtIt—wtLt—nKt)+iJt�It—5Kt) 
0 
we have the first order conditions as follows, 
t 




-Lf exp[- J piCr)dT] — (j),wt = 0 (71) 
0 
^tVt 二 - i h (72) 
- ^ t = (h (73) 
- A = -n(l>t - H t (74) 
Defining a new costate variable as 
t 
Xt = (f>,expl- J p{Cr)dr] (75) 
0 
then we rewrite the FOCs as 
= ^ (76) 
L 乂 = -Xtwt (77) 
V = PiCt) — Q (78) 
4 2 
4.3 Dynamics of Equilibrium 
From equations (76) and (78)，we obtain 
务二 Q-P{Ct) (79) 
Prom equations (72) and (74), we obtain 
A = - (80) rt 
Prom equations (72) (73) and (80)，we obtain 
| 二 ( … ) - 3 (81) 
By substituting equations (63) and (64) into it, we obtain 
t l = [g + 6 ) - 等 ? 广 V—^Oi+MJi i ^ i (82) 
Pt 
From equations (65) and (68), we have 
查 二 A d + G i C K ^ V l i + e i + a ' i ^ r i — s (83) Kt 
4 3 
Therefore, the three differential equations (79) (82) and (83), together 
with equations (64) (67) and (77) completely describe the whole system. 
From (77) we have 
L 乂 = ^wt 
so that 
(1 - = L^Ct 
Defining new variables as 
Pi = cx{l + + ai) 
= (I - a){l +01+ ai) 
we obtain 
[ l - a ) p t i 4 ' K / i L / ‘ 2 = l}，C t (84) 
By log-linearizing equation (84) around the steady state, we have 
P t + Oifit + PA + [ ^2 — ( 1 + x)]Lt -Ct = 0 ( 8 5 ) 
4 4 
From equation (64) 
Pt = - /J^tYc(IQaLti’+一i-ai 
Defining new variables as 
ft = ^i^c + 0-/) 
/34 = + (86) 
we obtain 
= (87) 
By log-linearizing equation (87) around the steady state, we have 
= (88) 
where we define a new variable as 
7 二 〜 〜 
4 5 
By solving equation (85) and (88), we obtain 
f 7 a ,(没 / — f > /OQX 
r, , r/^ 4 (没/ - 7) , 一3 … � 
"广瓦G + “ ― 计 斤 ( 9 0 ) 
where we define new variables as 
= + (91) 
= + + (92) 
From equation (84) and (87)，we obtain 
Lt = L{CuPuKt) 
lit 二 l4Ct’Pt,Kt) 
Therefore, we rewrite the agent's intertemporal budget constraint as 
i)t = nCt ,P t ,Kt ,Dt ) (93) 
4 6 
Hence, equations (79) (82) (83) and (93) would constitutes the dynamic 
system. 
By log-linearizing equations (79) around the steady state, we have 
Ct = - p ' i c n c r d t (94) 
Similarly, by log-linearizing equation (82) around the steady state, we have 
Pt =-[没/At + Wi — 1)允t + P2Lt]{Q + 0 (95) 
and by substituting equation (85)，(89) and (90) into it, we obtain 
• A A Pt = + ^)[J2lCt + J22pt + 
where we define new variables as 
了 ( l + x ) ( ^ / - 7 ) 1 
知 二 ft 1 
J.3 = - 1 — ( 9 6 ) Pe 
4 7 
By log-linearizing equations (83) around the steady state, we have 
kt =州 J21 + Ai)Ct + (J22 + A2)h + (^23 + A^)kt] (97) 
where we define new variables as 
A - & 
, — / 3 4 - 7 ) 1 
= （ 9 8 ) 
7 凡7 
Therefore we obtain the Jacobin Matrix as 
/ \ -p'{C*)C* 0 0 0 
+ + + 0 
S{J21 + Ai) 6{J22 + A2) S{J23-^As) 0 
^ J4I J J a A Q y 
Here it is easy to see that -p'{C)C is a negative eigenvalue and p is a positive 
4 8 
eigenvalue, the other two eigenvalues are determined by the submatrix 
( \ 
J = 
�6(J22 + A2) (5(J23 + A3) ^ 
4.3.1 Case 1 
If = 0, 
二 q:(1 + 0 / ) ’ / 3 2 = ( 1 - Q O ( 1 + 0 / ) 
= ft = + 
1 = Oi 
Then, 
Trace{J) 二 p 0 




when X > ：：� “， . ’ we have Dei(J) > 0’ hence we have two posi-
1 — a — adj 尸 
tive eigenvalues in this submatrix or, in another word, obtain three positive 
eigenvalues and one negative eigenvalue in the whole system, which means 
the steady state is a source. Otherwise, it will be a saddle point and would 
be unique. 
If 6i < 0, since Det{J) is always negative, we get the unique saddle path 
equilibrium. 
4.3.2 Case 2 
If Q i = ( j c 二 (Ti= 0, 
ft = a, /32 = (1 - a) 
th = < "4 = (1 -…没c 
t h = «7，Pg = - 7 ( a + X) 
7 = Oc “ 
5 0 
J22 = + ^ - 1 + x 
丁 1 , (1 + x ) ^ J23 = -1 H ； a + x 
乂 2 = (1 - • 1 
而 = a O c I ( 1 - a H c 
3 一 7 7(« + X) 
hence 
1 一 en Y — On 
Det{J) = { g i - 6 ) { g ^ 6 - a 5 ) — ^ 
hence Det[J) > 0 when x > > 0. Otherwise the steady state would 
(l-a)S 1 1 be a unique saddle point. Since g > 0,that means ^ ^ _ ^^ < 1 then 
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